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This thesis explores the current shortcomings in computer and Internet security,
and how the lack of user education in basic security concepts is detrimental to computer
and network security. The use of cryptography and potentially expensive technical
means to secure systems will fail when one neglects security education of users. The
thesis addresses a portion of the security education problem by designing and developing
a tool to educate users on the two major successful methods for penetrating a computer
system, weak passwords and social engineering. The tool can teach users how to pick
good passwords and the steps to take to prevent social engineering attacks. The tool
consists of a tutorial and ends with an exam to test user comprehension concerning
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many of the world's businesses today are moving toward the use of the Internet.
Many companies see the Internet playing a more fundamental role in their operations, as
an inexpensive, easy-to-deploy wide area transport network (Thyfault and Davis, May 5,
1997). Fifty-one Fortune 1000 companies were asked if the Internet could replace other
Wide Area Network (WAN) technologies. The response was 45% yes, 6% already
happening, 27% no, and 22% maybe ("Net Perceptions", May 5, 1997). In a follow-up
question, "What capabilities would the Internet need before you would use it as a WAN?"
The top response of 75% of companies was the need for better security ("Net
Perceptions", May 5, 1997).
To provide better security to computer systems and the Internet will require
educating the users and maintainers of these services. The solution to this problem of
providing better security requires that all computer users get involved. Users need to
realize that attacks on computer systems and the Internet are not just attacks on
individual systems, but are attacks on the entire community (Stoll, 1989). Overburdened
maintainers need automated tools to help secure these services. There is a need to develop
an infrastructure that has security built into it from the beginning.
This thesis will explore the current shortcomings in computer and Internet
security, and how the lack of user education in basic security concepts is detrimental to
computer and network security. The use of cryptography and potentially expensive
technical means to secure systems will fail when one neglects security education of users.
Cryptography is a discipline of cryptology dealing with coding a message so that it
can not be read, i.e., encrypt, encipher. Cryptology is the art and science of secret writing
and consists of cryptography and cryptanalysis. Cryptanalysis is a discipline of
cryptology that attempts to break encoded messages, without the knowledge of the
encoding technique. (Lundy, November 1997)
The thesis addresses a portion of the security education problem by designing and
developing a tool to educate users on the two major successful methods for penetrating a
computer system or network, weak passwords and social engineering. The prevention
tool will teach users how to pick good passwords and what steps to take to prevent
social engineering attacks. The tool will consist of a tutorial and end with an exam to test
user comprehension concerning picking good passwords and preventing social engineering
attacks.
The best way to protect a system from being penetrated is by using good
passwords and properly protecting passwords. This thesis provides some guidelines for
choosing good passwords and for protecting passwords. The thesis also explains what
attributes make up a good password and what attributes make up a weak password.
Social engineering is the process of using social interactions to obtain information
about a "victim's" computer system. The advantages of social engineering for penetrating
a computer system are the low cost, simple to implement, time efficient, and high success
at getting around a computer system's formidable security. The thesis provides
suggestions for preventing social engineering attacks.
The thesis is organized into the following chapters.
Chapter I Introduction, is the introduction of the thesis.
Chapter II Background in Computer and Network Security, presents a background
computer and network security and includes a definition for computer and network
security. The chapter also includes a discussion of the components that make up
computer and network security, and the methods used to provide computer and network
security.
Chapter III Intrusion Prevention and Detection: Current Tools and Techniques,
contains a discussion of current methods used to intrude on a system's security. This
chapter also discusses ways of preventing and detecting these intrusions.
Chapter IV Internet Intrusion Prevention and Detection Tool Requirements,
presents the requirements for an Internet intrusion detection and prevention tool. These
requirements will be a reference point for building a prevention tool.
Chapter V Design and Implementation of a Internet Prevention Tool By Educating
Users, contains a description of the design and implementation of the prevention tool.
Chapter VI Conclusion and Future Research, is the final chapter and ends with a
discussion of future enhancements to the current tool and tools for future research.
In addition, the thesis contains a list of references, bibliography, glossary and
appendices.
Appendix A explains how to assemble the three components used to create the
prevention tool. The first component is the weak password and social engineering
tutorial. The second component is a multiple choice exam to test user comprehension
concerning picking good passwords and preventing social engineering attacks. The final
component is a driver that integrates the tutorial with the testing component.
Appendix B contains the HTML listing for the tutorial portion of the prevention
tool.
Appendix C contains the HTML listing for the testing tool driver. This testing
tool driver integrates the tutorial with the multiple choice testing tool. The testing tool is
written using the Java programming language.
Appendix D contains the Java source code listing of the multiple choice test.
H. BACKGROUND IN COMPUTER AND NETWORK SECURITY
The basis of computer and network security is the protection of assets. These
assets include the information stored in a computer system or passed through a network,
and the infrastructure supporting computer systems and networks. For the purposes of
this paper the definition of computer and network security are the tools, policies,
procedures, and protocols used to protect information while being stored and processed
on a computer system, and while being transmitted through a network.
The three components of computer security are secrecy, accuracy, and
availability. Network security enforces the above three components with the addition of
the authenticity component. Authenticity is a related variant of accuracy. (Russell and
Gangemi, 1991)
Secrecy ensures that the release of information is granted to only those users who
have access to the information. This access is allowed or denied by the user's security
clearances. Another term used for secrecy is confidentiality. The use of the term secrecy
applies more towards government systems that protect national defense information and
highly proprietary business information. The use of the term confidentiality is more
prevalent in the business setting where protecting private information and sensitive
corporate data is important. Examples of private information are medical records and
payroll data. Internal memos, corporate trade secrets, and corporate strategy documents
are examples of sensitive corporate data. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
Accuracy is maintaining of information from corruption or unauthorized malicious
or accidental changes. It means that the system must not corrupt the information or allow
any unauthorized malicious or accidental changes to the information. Another term used
for accuracy is integrity. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
Authenticity keeps users from being able to transmit forged messages over a
network. It provides a way to verify the origin of the data by determining who entered or
sent the data. A stronger form of authenticity is nonrepudiation. Nonrepudiation prevents
the denial of receipt of a message by the receiver or the denial of transmission by the
sender. It provides a way of recording when a message was sent or received, and who the
sender and recipients are. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991), and (Stallings, 1995)
Availability is keeping information and resources available to the users. It means
that the computer system's hardware and software keep working efficiently and that the
system is able to recover quickly and completely if a disaster occurs. Related to
availability is denial of service. Denial ofservice is the preventing or inhibiting of
availability, and means that users are unable to get needed services. (Russell and Gangemi,
1991), and (Stallings, 1995)
A. COMPUTER SECURITY
For the purposes of this paper the definition of computer security is the tools,
policies, procedures, and protocols used to protect information while being stored and
processed on a computer system.
Russell and Gangemi (1991) describe four primary methods used by computer
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1. System Access Controls
"The first way in which a system provides computer security is by controlling
access to that system." (Russell and Gangemi, 1991) This access is usually controlled by
forcing one to identify oneself and having the system authenticate one's identity. In a
multi-user system there are three classic methods for proving one's identity. (Russell and
Gangemi, 1991)
The first method is knowing something that no one else knows. For example,
having a secret password to an account that no one else knows implies ownership of the
account. In the majority of cases this method provides a more than adequate means of
proving one's identity. The weakness of this method is passwords may be stolen or
obtained by other means. A stolen password may have come about by writing the
password down and someone else reading that password. One may have given the
password away. The password may be easy to guess, or found through systematic
cracking methods. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
The second method for proving one's identity is to have something that no one
else has. This may be a key, token, badge, or smart card. To have something that no one
else has implies ownship of the account. The weakness with this method of proving one's
identity is a key or equivalent may be stolen, lost, or duplicated. (Russell and
Gangemi, 1991)
The third and final classic method used to prove identity is by biometrics. This
method uses a previously stored biometric to prove one's identity. Biometrics is the use
of physical or behavior traits to identify a person. These traits may include fingerprint,
handprint, retina pattern, voice, signature, or keystroke pattern. Biometrics systems are
quite accurate, yet on occasions, reject valid users and accept invalid ones. The problem
with this system is that many people are not comfortable using it. (Russell and
Gangemi, 1991)
An additional method used to prove one's identity is to used a combination of the
above methods. By using a combination of methods, the weaknesses of an individual
method are minimized. For example, using a combination of a password and smart card to
prove one's identity would still prevent an intruder who somehow obtained the password
from accessing the system, and visa versa.
The use of passwords is still the authentication tool of choice, with the use of
smart cards and biometrics as secondary authentication tools (Russell and
Gangemi, 1991). Most systems require one to identify themselves with a login identifier
followed by a password. UNIX and Windows NT systems are example systems.
Difficult to guess passwords are the main defense against intruders. Garfinkel and
Spafford (1996) explain that the best passwords are difficult to guess because they:
1
.
Have both uppercase and lowercase letters.
2. Have digits and punctuation characters as well as letters. Be cautious with
some special characters, e.g., #, and @, for these may have special meaning to
terminal emulation software (Russell and Gangemi, 1991).
3. May include some control characters and spaces. Control characters like
CONTROL-S, CONTROL-H, CONTROL-/, and CONTROLS can cause
problem with terminal emulation software (Russell and Gangemi, 1991).
4. Are easy to remember, and so need not be written down.
Easy to guess and weak passwords may have the following attributes: (UNIX
Configuration Guidelines, August 1 996)
1 Are in a dictionary of some language.
2. Contain a proper noun, e.g., the name of a real or fictitious character or place.
3. Are acronyms common to some specific field or profession.
4. Are a variation of a first or a last name.
5. Match the login identifier or account (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996).
6. Contain the vender-supplied default passwords.
7. Contain no password at all.
The following are some suggestions for picking a good password:
1
.
Combine short words with a special character or a number, e.g., sale2noon or
love-hate (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996).
2. Choose an easy-to-remember phrase or lyric, and use the first letters to form a
password. Also add punctuation or mixed case letters. For example, "Hush a
my baby", would become Ham-b-. (UNIX Configuration Guidelines, August
1996).
3. Pick a nonsense word that is still pronounceable, e.g., cU2Morow or U4eyes
(Russell and Gangemi, 1991).
Passwords and the file that store passwords need protection. The following are
some suggestion for protecting passwords: (Russell and Gangemi, 1991), (UNIX
Configuration Guidelines, August 1996), and (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996)
1
.
Make sure that all logins have password.
2. Change all system, test, or guest passwords before allowing users to log in.
Example system, test, or guest accounts are root, system, test, demo, and
Administrator.
3. Do not ever share user passwords.
4. Do not write a password down, especially on a terminal, a computer, or
anywhere around a workspace. If one does write down a password, do not
identify it as a password. One may want to disguise a password by expanding
it to a phrase.
5. Do not type a password while anyone is watching.
6. Do not record a password online or send a password using electronic mail. The
Cuckoo's Egg, Clifford Stoll (1989), relates a story ofhow an intruder
gathered valid passwords by scanning a system's email and text files for the
word "password". If one does need to store passwords and accounts online or
send them using email, use encryption to protect the file or message.
7. Change a password immediately if one believes the password is stolen.
8. Change a password on a regular basis, even if a password is not compromised.
2. Data Access Controls
Controlling the access to the data stored on a system is the second way that a
system provides computer security. Data protection and access controls are usually not a
concern in the single user environment of a PC. In a multi-user system, shared
environment data protection and access controls are very important. It is common to
allow other users to read one's files, but one would probably not want other users
modifying or deleting files. In a multi-user environment where one trusts everyone, there
is still a need to protect data from accidental modifying and deleting. (Russell and
Gangemi, 1991)
Discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC) are the
two basic types of access controls that a system provides to protect files. Discretionary
access control allows the user to decide how to protect one's files and whether to share
data. Mandatory access control is more complex in that the system protects all the files.
A MAC system has a label for everything. The system decides whether a user can access
a file by using the security policy established by the user's organization, and comparing
the label of the user with the label of the file. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
DAC is an access policy that restricts access to files, and other system objects
such as directories and devices. The identity of the users and the groups to which they
belong is the basis of this access. Application of DAC is at the user's discretion. In
contrast, the system controls access in MAC. Table 2-1, show the three basic types of
access that most DAC systems support.
Type Description
Read Access to read the file.
Write Access to write, change, or replace the file.
Execute Execute permission to run the program. The execute permission only
makes sense if the file is a program.
Table 2-1 DAC Access Type. After Russell and Gangemi (1991).
Many systems divide the world of users into three categories: self, group, and
public (Table 2-2). This method for dividing the world of users into three categories is
sometimes referred to as self/group/public controls. Each of these categories assigned
access determines what users can do to a file. In UNIX, there are three categories namely,
user/group/other (UGO) controls. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991).
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Category Description
Self The creator or owner of the file.
Group A set of users. For example, all the users in a particular workgroup may
be in the R&D group.
Public Users other than those in category self and group.
Table 2-2 User Categories. After Russell and Gangemi (1991).
In UNIX, representation of each file's categories is by a set of bits called file
permissions. Using the command "Is -1" one would see a list of files with their file
permissions. Figure 1, is an example of file permissions for one item in a list.
-rw-rw-r- 1 doug duap 4025 Sep 10 06:08 README
Figure 1 File Permissions. After Russell and Gangemi (1991).
The file permissions for the README file owner doug indicate that the doug can
read and write the file (rw-), the duap group members also have read and write access
(rw-), while everyone else only has read access (r~). The first position of the README
file permission indicates the type of file. README is a plain file and indicated by the
dash (-) in the first position. Other file types include, but are not limited to the following:
directory (d), raw device (c), and block device (b). For more details on the different file
types that the UNIX system supports, see UNIX manual for the "Is" command. The
dash (-) in the rest of the file permissions is an indication of not having permission. For
the README file, the owner doug and duap group members do not have permission to
execute. Everyone else does not have write or read permission for README.
In general, the self/group/public controls satisfy all the needs for protecting files.
There are times when one needs to allow file access in different ways for different users,
or need to keep one user from accessing a file. Depending on how many special cases
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there are, this task is not easy to accomplish with the self/group/public controls. For this
reason many vendors began offering access control lists (ACLs) in addition to their
self/group/public controls. ACLs are lists of user and groups, with their specific
permissions, and are a more flexible way of providing discretionary access control. One of
the drawbacks in using ACLs is that each vendor implements ACLs in different ways. See
the system manuals or talk with the OS vendor for more details about how the vendor
implements ACLs. See also Russell and Gangemi (1991), and Garfinkel and Spafford
(1996).
MAC is an access policy supported by systems that process sensitive data.
Sensitive data may include government classified information or sensitive corporate data.
In a MAC system all subjects and all objects must have sensitivity labels. Examples of
subjects are users and programs. Files, directories, devices, windows, and sockets are
examples of objects.
Sensitivity labels have two parts, a classification and a set of categories.
Categories are sometimes known as compartments. The following is an example of a
sensitivity label:
SECRET [SOME, SET, OF, CATEGORIES]
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Classifications are arranged as levels of trust, with each level of classification
having more trust than the classification beneath it. An example of classification levels,






Categories or compartments are nonhierarchical and represent separate areas of
information in a system. Together, the categories make up a category or compartment set.
One would use a category subset to separate information on a need to know basis. A
certain category subset would prevent one with a classification higher than the
classification of the information from accessing the information. For information on access
decisions in a MAC system, see Russell and Gangemi, 1 99 1
.
3. System and Security Administrations
The past two sections explain how a system provides computer security. This
section introduces the human side of computer security. Security is not automatic. Both
the system and security administrators must work together to carry out the site's security
policy. It is up to the system and security administrators to make or break the site's
system security. Training users, setting up and protecting the password file and other
system-critical files, and examining audit logs are some of the many ways to translate a
site's security policy into human terms. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991
)
Policies are the rules of conduct and behavior that arise from a consensus among a
constituency. They establish the acceptable standards of behavior in one's facility and are
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essential for communicating consensus on an issue. A collection of written decisions on
how to address particular situations are, in effect, policies. Placing this collection of
decisions in an accessible location provides a way to disseminate this information, which
prevents confusion and duplication of efforts among staff and users. (A Guide to
Developing Computing Policy Documents, 1996)
For effective policy and security awareness to occur, management must lead.
Security concerns and awareness by the users are important, but the users cannot build or
sustain an effective culture of security. Management must treat security as important, and
abide by all the same rules and regulations as everyone else. Computer security means
protecting information. All plans, policies, and procedures should reflect the need to
protect information in whatever form it takes. It is up to system and security
administrators to work with management to set this computing and security policy.
(Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996)
For information on setting up a computing and security policy see Oppenheimer,
Wagner, and Crabb (1997), and Garfinkel and Spafford (1996).
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4. System Design
The final way in which a system provides computer security is through the design
of the system. Creating a system to meet specific security requirements enhances a
system's computer security. These enhancements to computer security come about
through the following: (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
1. Support sound principles of hardware and operating system design.
2. Take advantage of the basic hardware and software security characteristics in
the system design.
3. Have the ability to support specific security features in the future.
B. NETWORK SECURITY
For the purposes of this paper the definition of network security is the tools,
policies, procedures, and protocols used to protect information while being transmitted
through a network.




Keep The Network Communication From Being Intercepted
2. Encrypt Data Being Sent
3. Apply Trusted System Principles
4. Configure The Network For Security
1. Keep The Network Communication From Being Intercepted
Some ways at keeping network communication from being intercepted include
protecting networking equipment and choosing the most secure networking medium. Place
networking equipment, such as switches and hubs, in physically secure places where
intruders cannot easily attack. Choose networking cables that are difficult to tap or make
it difficult to tap by placing the cables in a conduit. A fiber cable is an example of a
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networking medium that is difficult to tap. Placing network cables in a conduit filled with
pressurized gas and a pressure sensor that detects a drop in pressure is a way of making a
network medium difficult to tap. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
2. Encrypt Data Being Sent
Encryption is a good way to protect the secrecy of network communication.
Techniques such as message authentication and digital signatures may use encryption to
ensure the accuracy and authenticity of network communication. Message authentication
is a procedure that can ensure accuracy and authenticity by verifying that received
messages are unmodified and the messages come from the alleged source. It may also
ensure accuracy by verifying that the sequencing of messages between parties is
unmodified and that no delay or replay of the messages occurred. Message authentication
protects two parties who exchange messages from any third party. However, it does not
protect the two parties against each other. The use of a digital signature can provide the
protection necessary between a sender and receiver who do not have complete trust for
each other. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991), and (Stallings, 1995)
A digital signature is an authentication technique that includes measures to provide
nonrepudiation between two parties. Nonrepudiation prevents the denial of receipt of a
message by the receiver or the denial of transmission by the sender. A digital signature is




It must be able to verify the author and the date and time of the signature.
2. It must be able to authenticate the contents at the time of the signature.
3. The signature must be verifiable by third parties, to resolve disputes.
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A product that provides a majority of the above techniques is Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP). Phil Zimmerman created PGP and placed it on the Internet. PGP provides
confidentiality and authentication services for email and file storage. Other services that
PGP provides are compression, email compatibility, and segmentation. PGP provides
message compression for email transmission or file storage using ZIP. ZIP is a free
compression package written by Jen-lup Gailly, Mark Adler, and Richard Wales. To
provide email compatibility, PGP uses radix-64 to convert encrypted messages to ASCII
strings. ASCII is an acronym for American Standard Code for Information Interchange.
ASCII is a standard to achieve compatibility between various types of data processing
and data communications equipment (Webster's New World Dictionary ofComputer
Terms, 1983). Radix-64 conversion is a technique for mapping arbitrary binary data into
printable characters. PGP provides segmentation and reassembly service to accommodate
maximum email message size limitations. (Lundy, November 1997) and (Stallings, 1995)
The advantages of PGP are the application is processor independent, based on
extremely good algorithms, and is not controlled by any government. Versions of PGP
exist for DOS/Windows, Macintosh, and Unix. Currently, there are two versions of PGP
available, a free version and commercial version. (Lundy, November 1997) and
(Stallings, 1995)
Another scheme for providing secure email over the Internet is Privacy Enhanced
Mail (PEM). PEM is a standard adopted by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) to
provide secure email. PEM is implemented at the application layer, allowing it to operate
independent of the lower protocol layers, operating system, or host. PEM is compatible
with nonenhanced mail systems and multiple mail transport facilities. It provides support
for secure mailing lists and PC users. It also is compatible with various key management
mechanisms. PEM provides confidentiality, authentication, message integrity, and key
management services. (Schneier, 1996), and (Stallings, 1995).
For further details concerning PGP and PEM, see Stallings (1995) and Schneier
(1996).
3. Apply Trusted System Principles
Applying trusted system principles means extending computer security methods
to the network environment. Just as system access controls require a user to authenticate
oneself before being allowed access to the system, network access controls require one to
authenticate oneself before being allowed access to network services. In network access
controls, a user on one system must identify and authenticate themselves before
connecting to another system. The strengths that networks require users and systems to
identify and authenticate themselves differ between networks. In most networks a user
and system must prove their identity only once to access network services. In more
highly trusted networks, a user and system must prove their identity each time they
request a network service. The common way users prove their identity in a network is by
using passwords. Transmitting passwords in plaintext gives an intruder the opportunity
to steal these passwords. An intruder can later use these passwords to attack the network
and all the hosts using the network. Network authentication systems such as Kerberos
addresses this problem of plaintext authentication by using a set of encrypted keys called
tickets for authentication. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology created Kerberos,
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which is a network authentication system based on private key cryptography (Garfinkel
and Spafford, 1996). (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
Discretionary access control (DAC) in a network environment may restrict access
to the network for certain remote users and systems. Certain network services might be
available only to certain groups and systems. Extending labeling and mandatory access
control (MAC) to the network environment will make it possible for systems to
recognize the sensitivity of data being sent among systems. MAC will allow the access of
data between systems. For example, MAC keeps TOP SECRET data from being sent
over a network to a system labeled as SECRET. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
Expanding system and security administrations to the network environment may
be a large task. This task is usually large enough to create new groups of network
administrators and network security officers. These groups are responsible for creating
and carrying out network security policy, configuring the network and all network
security features, establishing the network databases used for access control, and
monitoring network traffic and performance. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
Just as system design enhances computer security, a network design that meets
specific security requirements will also enhance network security. These enhancements to
network security come about by taking advantage of the following:
1
.
Support sound design principles.
2. Take advantage of the basic hardware and software security characteristics in
network equipment.
3. Have the ability to support specific security features in the future.
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4. Configure The Network For Security
Configuring the network for security is the responsibility of the network
administrator and network security office. They must work to balance the carrying out of
network security policy with the design of the network.
C. COMPUTER AND NETWORK SECURITY
For the purposes of this paper the definition of computer and network security are
the tools, policies, procedures, and protocols used to protect information being stored and
processed on a computer system, and while being transmitted through a network.
Primary concern of computer security is with the protection of individual
computer systems, whether or not the system is connected to a network. Primary
concern of network security is with communication channels. Many of the threats to
computers enter from a network channel and the endpoints of communications channels
are usually computers. One can not ignore either of the concerns of computer security or
network security to have a comprehensive computer and network security. (Lundy,
November 1997)
The use of cryptography plays a great role in the protection of computers and
networks. Governments, banks, and other organizations use cryptography to keep
messages secret and protect electronic transactions from modification (Anderson,
November 1 994). By using cryptography to protect data and communications,
individuals can protect their privacy (Schneier, 1996).
21
D. INTRUSION PREVENTION AND DETECTION
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1991) defines "prevention" as the act
of preventing or hindering.
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1991) defines "detection" as the act of
detecting.
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1991) defines "intrusion" as the act of
intruding or the state of being intruded; especially the act of wrongfully entering upon,
seizing, or taking possession of the property of another.
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ffl. INTRUSION PREVENTION AND DETECTION: CURRENT TOOLS AND
TECHNIQUES
A. DEFINITION OF AN INTRUDER
An intruder is an entity that makes unauthorized access to a computer system or
network. This entity may be a person, an automated agent, or a combination of the two.
B. METHODS USED TO INTRUDE
Effective methods used to intrude on a system's security are the use of social
engineering and password cracking.
1. Social Engineering
The hacker community associates the term Social Engineering with the process of
using social interactions to obtain information about a "victim's" computer system. This
interaction may be as simple as calling a company and asking people for their passwords,
possibly by impersonating a company's information security staff. Blackmail and
physical threat are other methods of Social Engineering. More elaborate methods used to
obtain a company's sensitive information include going through the company's garbage,
posing as an employee of the company, or even becoming an employee of the company.
(Winkler and Dealy, 1995)
The advantages of social engineering are low cost, simple to implement, time
efficient, and high success at getting around a company's formidable security.
2. Password Cracking
Password cracking is obtaining a target host's password file and running password
cracking software against the password file. This password cracking method attempts to
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find valid passwords for accounts in the password file. Examples of UNIX password
cracking software are Crack and John the Ripper. Note that similar password cracking
software is available on Windows NT. Finding the root password would be the most
threatening to a system's security, since an intruder will have total access to the targeted
host. One of the best defenses against password cracking is having difficult-to-guess
passwords for all accounts in the password file. See section II.A. 1 System Access
Contr 1 • for guidelines in choosing difficult to guess passwords.
3. Stealing Superuser Privileges
Most intruding methods attempt to gain greater access to a system. These
attempts may include social engineering and password cracking methods. Usually, the
main objective is to gain access to a special user account that can do virtually anything to
the targeted host system. In the UNIX OS, this special user account is the root account
commonly referred to as the "superuser". Intruders exploit this UNIX weakness by
learning the root password or gain superuser privileges by exploiting known UNIX
security holes.
In Windows NT the name of the special user account is Administrator. Attack
methods used on a Windows NT system would be similar to those used against a UNIX
system. These attacks center on gaining access to the Administrator account or an account
with the Administrator privileges.
Many methods for gaining superuser privileges are through exploiting known
security vulnerabilities. A vulnerability is a point where a system is susceptible to attack.
(Russell and Gangemi, 1991) Over the years people have found many vulnerabilities in
24
UNIX. The following areas are where some of the UNIX vulnerabilities exist or were
found in the past:
1
.
Smashing the Stack or Buffer Overflow
2. Telnet
3. File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
4. Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)
5. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
6. World Wide Web (WWW)
7. Network File System (NFS)
8. Network Information Service (NIS)
9. X Window System
a. Smashing the Stack or Buffer Overflow
Smashing the stack is a programming method that combines the C
programming language with specific UNIX file system permissions to manipulate the
operating system to grant intruders superuser privileges. Smith (May 7, 1997), analyzing
how to construct stack smashing exploits, explains how these exploits work and what to
do to prevent the exploits. Other readings on stack smashing include Instenes (April
1997), Aleph One (April 1997), and Aleph One (November 8, 1996).
b. Telnet
The telnet application lets users log in to remote hosts over TCP/IP
networks. The telnet access-control mechanism relies on a password for a user account to
authenticate one's identity. The transmitting of this password and account information is
in cleartext. A network sniffer, installed by an intruder, is able to capture passwords by
monitoring local network traffic for login activity. Note, the telnet application protocol is
not inherently vulnerable, but the transporting of the password and account information
in the clear is vulnerable. (Gallen and Sutterfield, November 1996)
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c. File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
The FTP Application allows users to transfer files between two hosts
over TCP/IP networks. FTP suffers from the same vulnerability as telnet when
transmitting password and account information. Misconfigured FTP servers may allow
remote access to all files on the server. Common misconfigurations include access to the
system password file and granting improper user privilege to the anonymous login
account. (Gallen and Sutterfield, November 1996)
Anonymous FTP Abuses (1996), provides a general overview of problems
associated with abuses of anonymous FTP (File Transfer Protocol). The document
provides detection, reaction, and prevention guidelines to address two issues related to
anonymous FTP abuse: software piracy, and misconfigured or compromised FTP server.
d. Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)
The TFTP allows a user to transfer files from one system to another. It
lacks the same degree of user authentication and file protection as FTP. General use of
TFTP is in select applications, such as router software, configuration loading, or diskless
workstation and X terminal boot processes. Improperly configured TFTP can provide
unauthorized users access to files, which could allow an intruder to steal the password
file. TFTP should be run on systems that need it for business purposes and should run in
a secured mode to restrict TFTP to files in a specified directory. (Gallen and Sutterfield,
November 1996)
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e. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
The SMTP protocol allows users to send e-mail from one host to another
over TCP/IP networks. The most common implementation of an SMTP server is the
UNIX sendmail program, which is a well-known source of security problems. Most
vulnerabilities in SMTP servers involve tricking the server to execute the body of a mail
message as a shell script. A script may be written to mail the system password to the
intruder, or install backdoors for telnet access for the intruder.
/ World Wide Web (WWW)
The WWW is a system for exchanging information over the Internet.
Special programs called Web servers make up the backbone of the Web. Web servers
make information available on the network. Other programs called Web browsers allow
one to access information stored on a Web server. (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1 996)
Most Web-servers allow putting programs behind Web pages to process
user-submitted data. The Common Gateway Interface (CGI) is a protocol often used to
create these programs. These CGI programs may present a security risk if Web
programmers use improper programming techniques.
g. Network File System (NFS)
NFS is a mechanism for sharing disk volumes between hosts over a
TCP/IP network. The building block for NFS is Remote Procedure Calls (RPC's). RPC
allows program distributing and makes it easy to create network-based client/server
programs. Network-based client/server programs communicate with each other using
remote procedure calls. An example of program distributing is taking a computationally
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intensive algorithm running on a high-speed computer, a remote sensing device running on
another computer, and the results compile on a third. (Gallen and Sutterfield, November
1996), and (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996)
The default means for RPC clients and servers to authenticate themselves
is weak and is easy to simulate by an intruder. Each RPC request contains the UID and a
set of GID's that a RPC server implicitly trusts. There are no provisions for
authenticating UID and GID's on the RPC server. Little known features in the
portmapper permit easy subversion of a misconfigured NFS server host. These features
allow unauthorized viewing or modifying of files on exported volumes. The portmapper
program provides a directory of sorts for all RPC-based services. (Gallen and Sutterfield,
November 1996), and (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996)
h. Network Information Service (NIS)
NIS lets multiple systems share the same password, group, and host files
across a network. NIS was previously known as Yellow Pages. Because NIS is vulnerable
to several attack methods, one should avoid using NIS. Intruders usually exploit NIS
vulnerabilities to steal the password file. Cracking a password in the password file will
mean access to all hosts in that NIS domain. (Gallen and Sutterfield, November 1996)
i. X Window System
The X Window System, i.e., X, is a popular network-based window
system that allows may programs to share a single graphical display. X-based programs
display their output in windows. This can be on the same computer that the program is
running on or any other computer on the network. A special program called the X
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Window Server, or X server, controls each graphical device that runs X. Other programs,
called X clients, connect to the X server over the network and tell the X server what to
display. (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996)
An improperly protected X can allow X client programs to monitor
information on X displays. This information may be email messages typed on a
keyboard, or passwords typed on a keyboard. The two common mechanisms used to
protect X is the magic cookie mechanism, and the xhost mechanism. The magic cookie
mechanism uses a 128-bit "cookie". The X Display Manager (xdm) or the user creates
this "cookie" at login, and stores the "cookie" in a user's .Xauthority file. Each client
program reads the "cookie" from the .Xauthority file and passes it to the server when
establishing the connection. This limits access to the user's display process that have
access to the user's .Xauthority file. The xhost mechanism uses an access control list of all
hosts allowed to access the X server. Even with the above mechanisms, a target host
running X and accepting a telnet to port 6000, may be vulnerable to a denial of service
attack. Some X servers read a small packet from the client before determining whether or
not the client is in the xhost list. If a client connects to the X server but does not transmit
this initial packet, the X server halts all operation until the X server times out in 30
seconds. Some implementations of the X server will remain frozen until the connection is
aborted. (Farmer and Venema, December 2, 1993), and (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996)
4. Security Analysis Tool for Auditing Networks (SATAN) Attacks
SATAN is a network scanning tool used to probe one's host system for well-
known security vulnerabilities. SATAN scans one's host system using the network where
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the host resides. Scanning a host through the network is characteristic of what an outside
intruder would do. Wietse Venema and Dan Farmer are the authors of SATAN. Venema
and Farmer (1993) created SATAN to help system administrators determine network
related security problems, reports the problems, and do so in a way that would not
exploit the problems. Wietse also authored the tcpwrapper package, while Dan authored
the Computer Oracle and Password System (COPS) package. Both the tcpwrapper and
COPS packages protect a host from the "inside". Tcpwrappers allows one to monitor and
filter incoming requests from servers started by inetd. Tcpwrappers also allows one to
allow or deny access to one's host from other hosts on the network. COPS is a collection
of short shell scripts and C programs that perform vulnerability checks of one's hosts.
Some of the checks include bad permissions on various system files and directories, and
malformed configuration files. (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996)
The basic attack of SATAN is to use Unix utilities to gather information on a
target host. Example of Unix utilities that SATAN uses are finger, showmount, and
rpcinfo. The finger utility gathers information about users on a targeted host. The
showmount utility finds out what files a targeted host exports. The rpcinfo utility gathers
information about a targeted host's RPC services. The information gathered from these
utilities cues SATAN as to what vulnerabilities may be available for exploit.
5. Trust Attacks
Farmer and Venema (1993) discusses the notion of trust in the situation when a
server permits the use of a local resource by a client without password authentication
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when the use of password authentication is customary. The paper limits the discussion of
trust to clients in disguise.
The ways the host trusts include the following:
1
.
.rhost and host.equiv files that allow access without password verification
2. Windows servers remote access that allow remote systems to use and abuse
privileges
3. Exporting files under access control of the NFS
It is possible to spoof, fool, or subvert any form of trust. If an intruder
compromises the database contained by a host, the intruder can convince the target host
that he is coming from any trusted host. The compromised database may be NIS, DNS, or
something else. It is possible to determine the hosts trusted by a target by the location the
system administrator or system accounts last logged in from. An example of a system
account on UNIX is the root account.
C. POSSIBLE WAYS OF PREVENTING AND DETECTING INTRUDING
METHODS
1. Preventing Social Engineering




Do Not Rely Upon Common Internal Identifiers
2. Implement a Call Back Procedure When Disclosing Protected Information
3. Implement a Security Awareness Program
4. Identify Direct Computer Support Analysts
5. Create A Security Alert System
6. Social Engineering to Test Security Policies
a. Do Not Rely Upon Common Internal Identifiers
Many companies rely on some type of identifier to authenticate
employees, e.g., an Employee Number. Unfortunately, intruders will compile a list of
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valid identifiers and use these identifiers to authenticate themselves when challenged.
Intruders easily obtain identifiers from real employees as part of the Social Engineering
attack.
Companies should separate personnel functions from computer support
functions by having a separate identifier for the two activities. A separate identifier would
provide additional security to both personnel and computer activities.
b. Implement a Call Back Procedure When Disclosing Protected
Information
One may have prevented many of the Social Engineering attacks by
verifying the identity of the caller by calling them back at their proper telephone number,
as listed in the company telephone directory. This procedure creates a minimal
inconvenience to legitimate activities, while providing enhanced security for the company
sensitive information. Requiring employees to call back anyone asking for personal or
proprietary information minimize compromises. Use of Caller ID services might also be
an acceptable solution.
c. Implement a SecurityAwareness Program
Computer professionals cannot assume that basic security practices are
basic to non-computer professionals. A good security awareness program implemented at
minimal cost can save a company from loosing millions of dollars. Without a good
security awareness program, non-computer professionals would not know that giving out
one's password to a stranger is a security risk to the company's information.
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d. Identify Direct Computer Support Analysts
Every employee of a company should have one computer analyst be the
focal point for all computer support, and should be the only person to directly contact
the employee. Each analyst should have assigned no more than 60 employees, and
instruct all employees to contact their analyst if ever contacted by someone claiming to be
from computer support.
e. CreateA Security Alert System
A security alert system should be in place to allow an employee to alert
other employees of a possible intrusion. It is important to note that without this system,
intruders are able to continue the same Social Engineering attacks. Security alert system is
paramount to barring easy access for intruders.
/ Social Engineering to Test Security Policies
The only conceivable method to test security policies and their
effectiveness is by using Social Engineering. There are many security assessments to test
for physical and electronic vulnerabilities, but few assessments study the human
vulnerabilities inherent in computer users. Note that only qualified and trusted people
should perform these attacks.
2. Preventing Password Cracking
The best ways to prevent password cracking are to create difficult-to-guess
passwords, and to protect the passwords and the file that store passwords. Refer to
Section II.A.l, for suggestions on how to choose good passwords and how to protect
passwords.
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3. Preventing And Detecting the Stealing of Superuser Privileges
a. PreventingAnd Detecting Anonymous FTP Attacks
One way to prevent anonymous FTP attacks is to have a properly
configured and administered FTP area. Anonymous FTP Configuration Guidelines
(1995), provides guidelines to configuring an anonymous FTP area. This document breaks




2. Providing writable directories in your anonymous FTP configuration
3. Related CERT Advisories
The "Configuring anonymous FTP" section suggests that the site uses the
most recent version of their FTP daemon. The FTP account and associated group of the
FTP account should not own the anonymous FTP directories. The document seems to
recommend using the root account, the system group, and protecting the FTP root
directory and FTP subdirectories so that only root account has write permission. The
document strongly recommends not to use the system's /etc/passwd and /etc/group in the
-ftp/etc directory. The document recommends dummy ~ftp/etc/passwd and
~ftp/etc/group files and the passwd file should not contain account names that are the
same as those in the system's /etc/passwd.
The section on "Providing writable directories in your anonymous FTP
configuration," provides three suggestions for those sites that want a "drop off directory:
use a modified FTP daemon, use protected directories, and use a single disk drive. Use a
modified FTP daemon that will control access to the "drop off directory. Use protected
directories only known between local users and anonymous users that wish to have "drop
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off permission. This method requires prior coordination and cannot guarantee protection
from unwanted use of the writable FTP area, but has been used effectively by many sites.
Use a single disk drive for the writable FTP area and monitor that area on a continuing
basis to ensure that it is not being misused.
The "Related CERT Advisories" section points to advisories related to
FTP daemons or impact on providing FTP service.
b. Preventing SMTP Attacks
To prevent SMTP attacks, Gallen and Sutterfield (November 1996) offer
the following guidelines for configuring sendmail:
1
.
Whenever possible, remove the prog mailer, which allows the machine to
execute an e-mail message as a program
2. Disable the EXPN and VRFY commands, which may let intruders gain
usernames
3. Disable the DEBUG mode and WIZ command, if applicable
4. Remove mail aliases that send to programs such as decode
5. Apply appropriate security patches
6. Upgrade to the latest version of sendmail
c. Preventing World Wide Web (WWW) Attacks
To prevent some of the security risks posed by CGI applications, Gallen
and Sutterfield (November 1996) suggest avoiding the following programming techniques:
calls to system() and popen(); failures to detect and filter HTML metacharacters for the
newline or semicolon characters; and scripts that directly pass user-supplied input as
command-line arguments. The danger is an intruder can insert their own code into a CGI
script and open up security holes on the targeted system. Gallen and Sutterfield also
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suggest removing CGI utilities and applications that are not necessary for the continued
operation of a Web site.
The Security Improvement Team Networked Systems Survivability
Program has put out a booklet concerning public Web site security. This booklet is in
draft form for limited external review and entitled Securityfor a Public Web Site (April 21,
1997). Securityfor a Public Web Site recommends and describes a three-step approach
for improving the security of a public Web site. The approach requires implementing
security practices in three areas which Table 3-1 summarizes.
Area Recommend Practice
Selecting server 1 . Include explicit security requirements when selecting server and host
technology technologies.
Configuring 2. Isolate the Web server from the organization's internal network.
server 3. Maintain the authoritative copy of the web site content on a more secure host.
technology 4. Offer only essential network services and operating system services on the server
host machine.
5. Make use of available access controls for information stored on the host machine.
6. Configure the Web server software to enhance security.
7. Consider the security implications when choosing external programs that the
server can execute.
Operating the 8. Administer the Web server in a secure manner.
server 9. Routinely look for unexpected changes to directories and files.
10. Regularly inspect the system and network logs.
Table 3-1 Securityfor a Public Web Site. Summary ofRecommended Practices. After
Securityfor a Public Web Site (April 21, 1997).
Securityfor a Public Web Site also recommends that a site establish
security policies that mandate appropriate security practices for network administrators
and users. For example, the site may want to establish a policy that requires system and
network administrators to adopt and implement several of the practices described in the
Securityfor a Public Web Site booklet
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d. Preventing Network File System (NFS) Attacks
Administrators ofNFS environments must choose carefully whether to
use NFS in a particular environment and should read all available vendor security bulletins
and CERT advisories regarding NFS. (Gallen and Sutterfield, November 1996)
To remove common and known security vulnerabilities in NFS, see the
NFS section of the UNIX Computer Security Checklist (December 19, 1995).
e. Preventing Network Information Service (NIS) Attacks
Garfinkel and Spafford ( 1 996) suggest the following to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of a site's NIS databases:
1
.
Protect the site with a firewall or at least a smart router, and not allow the
UDP packets associated with RPC to cross between the site's internal
network and the outside world. Because RPC uses a portmapper, i.e.,
portmap or rpcbind, one cannot know the actual UDP port used by RPC. The
only safe strategy is to block all UDP packets except those one specifically
wishes to let cross.
Use Wietse Venema's free portmapper program, which allows one to specify a
list of computers by hostname or IP address to allow or deny access to
specific RPC servers. These portmapper programs are available from
ftp://ftp.win.tue.nl/pub/security/portmap_4.tar.gz, and
ftp://ftp.win.tue.nl/pub/security/rpcbind_2.tar.gz.
2. Some versions of NIS support the use of the /var/yp/securenets file for NIS
servers. This file, when present, can specify a list of networks that may
receive NIS information
3. Do not tighten up NIS but forget DNS! If the site decides that outsiders
should be able to learn about the site's IP addresses, be sure to run two
nameserver, one for internal use and one for external use.
/ PreventingX Window System Attacks
The best way of preventing X attacks is to properly protect X and stay
current with vendor updates to X. The X Window System section of Garfinkel and
Spafford (1996) suggests ways at protecting X.
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4. Preventing And Detecting SATAN Attacks
TCP/IP wrapper is available through anonymous ftp from
ftp://ftp.win.tue.nl/pub/security or ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/tcp_wrappers/.
One of the best methods in preventing a SATAN attack is to use SATAN on
one's own system. Correcting the vulnerabilities that SATAN finds will prevent intruders
from exploiting these vulnerabilities.
If SATAN scans one's system, programs like TCP/IP wrapper and Courtney can
help to detect the scan. An installed TCP/IP wrapper program allows the host system to
provide additional network logging information and gives a system administrator the
ability to allow or deny access from certain systems or domains (List of Security Tools,
August 1996). Courtney is a program specifically developed to detect if one's system is
scanned with SATAN.
5. Preventing Trust Attacks
Two methods used to prevent spoofing attacks are not using any trust, and using
cryptographic methods. The first method of not using any trust will make a site less
vulnerable to host spoofing, but is perhaps the most impractical of the two methods. The
second method is to use cryptographic protocols.
Although "broken" by cryptographic methods, using secure RPC protocol will
provide better assurance than RPC authentication schemes that do not use any form of
encryption. Examples of secure RPC protocols include secure NFS, and NIS+. Other
hardware and software cryptographic solutions are being developed, but are either
incomplete or require changes to system software. Smartcards are an example of a
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hardware solution, while Kerberos is an example of a software solution.
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IV. INTERNET INTRUSION PREVENTION AND DETECTION TOOL
REQUIREMENTS
ID Requirement
IPT 1. The tool shall detect all known intruding methods initiated over a
network.
For example, the tool should be able to detect if a host is being
scanned with SATAN or Internet Security Scanner (ISS).
IPT2. The tool shall capture and analyze network traffic in and out of the a
site.
This requirement determines if an intruder has penetrated the site or
if secret or classified data is leaving the site.
IPT 2.1. The tool shall analyze the network traffic for all intruder methods to
determine exploited vulnerabilities.
This requirement determines if an intruder has penetrated the site
using common tools such as SATAN and ISS.
IPT 3. The tool shall generate information in real-time.
The real-time requirement is to provide security staff and security
tools the ability to react to intrusion events in real-time.
IPT 4. The tool shall send out alarms once it detects an intruder.
This requirement provides security staff with an intruder alert
mechanism.
IPT 5. The tool shall minimize false intruder alarms.
An intrusion detection system shall try to minimize false alarms to
minimize the cost of security personnel reacting to the alarm. Wasted
effort in analyzing and determining the proper actions to stop an
intrusion is a result of false alarms. This wasted effort translates to
added computer security costs.
IPT 6. The tool shall dynamically restrict intruder access to a site or host.
Upon detecting an intruder, the tool shall dynamically prevent the
intruder from further access. It also tries to isolate the intruder from
causing any damage to the site or host.
IPT 7. The tool shall educate operators concerning proper security
procedures.
The tool shall orient new operators to a site's security policies and
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ID Requirement
procedures, and provide points of contact for not only computer
security issues but all security issues.
IPT 7. 1 . The tool shall educate general users in choosing safe passwords.
Exploiting weak passwords is one of two methods most successful
for penetrating a computer system. The other most successful
method is social engineering. The tool will inform users concerning
weak passwords and how to pick good passwords.
7.2. The tool shall interact with general users in choosing safe passwords.
The user will interact with the tool in choosing a password. The tool
will test if the user's password is a weak or good password.
7.3. The tool shall test a user's comprehension of the site's security
procedures.
The test will determine if a user understands the site's security
procedures. Once a user passes the test, the site may now issue the
user a computer account on the site's computer system.
The tool shall educate system administrators on how to properly
configure a host.
The are several services that the system provides for a variety of
users. The tool will instruct a system administrator on how to
properly configure these services.
IPT 8.1. The tool shall instruct a system administrator how to properly
configure FTP.
!" 8.2. The tool shall instruct a system administrator how to properly
configure SMTP.
? 8.3. The tool shall instruct a system administrator how to properly
configure WWW.
IPT 8.4. The tool shall instruct a system administrator how to properly
configure TFTP.
IPT 8.5. The tool shall instruct a system administrator how to properly
configure NFS.
IPT 8.6. The tool shall instruct a system administrator how to properly
configure NIS.
The tool shall instruct a system administrator how to install and
monitor a host's security tools.
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ID Requirement
IPT 9.1. The tool shall instruct a system administrator how to install and
monitor TCP wrappers.
10. The tool shall provide an integrated environment for testing
vulnerabilities of a host system as well as vulnerabilities of network
host systems.
The tool will integrate popular computer security tools, available at
little or no cost, into an integrated environment. Computer security
tools such as SATAN, ISS, COPS, and Crack are good candidates for
integrating into a single environment.
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V. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A INTERNET PREVENTION
TOOL BY EDUCATING USERS
The focus of the thesis project is to provide a tool for educating common multi-
user system users about computer security. The requirements for an intrusion detection
tool given in the previous section will be a reference point for building a computer
security tutorial.
The thesis project will focus on educating users on the two major successful
methods for penetrating a computer system, weak passwords and social engineering. The
tool will teach users how to pick good passwords and what steps to take to prevent
social engineering attacks. At the end of the tutorial a test for user comprehension would
follow.
The author develops this thesis project with Web based components, e.g., a Web
browser, and JAVA.
A. DESIGN OF THE WEAK PASSWORD AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING
PREVENTION TOOL
The weak password and social engineering prevention tool will consist of two
parts. The first part of the tool is a tutorial introducing the subject of weak passwords
and social engineering. The second part of the tool consists of a multiple choice test for
testing the comprehension of the user.
The test portion of the tool would ideally consist of twenty-five multiple choice
questions. Using multiple choice questions will make it possible to automate correcting of
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the test. This automating of the test will allow the user quick feedback on how well one
scored on the test.
Appendix A explains the assembly of the tool. Appendix B and Appendix C
contain the HTML listing of the tutorial and the testing tool driver, respectively.
Appendix D contains the Java source code listing of the test.
Table 5-1 below includes possible multiple choice questions and the correct
answers.
ID Possible Test Questions Answers
Ql. True or false. The definition of computer security is the
tools, policies, procedures, and protocols used to protect




Q2. What are the two most successful methods used to intrude
on a computer system's security?
I. Social Engineering
II. Exploiting weak passwords
III. Sharing passwords
IV. Leaving computer logged into one's account
V. Exploiting an operating system vulnerability
A. I&II






ID Possible Test Questions Answers
Q3. Select the best answer from A through E. What attributes B
make up a good password?
I. Easy to remember
II. Contain acronyms common to a specific field or
profession
III. Difficult to guess
IV. Have digits and punctuation characters as well as
letters
V. Are a variation of a first or a last name
A. I, II, & IV
B. I, III, & IV
C. I,IV,&V
D. None of the above
E. All of the above
Q4. Select the best answer from A through E. What attributes C
make up weak password?
I. Have both uppercase and lowercase letters
II. Are in a dictionary of some language
III. Contain no password at all
IV. Combine short words with a special character or a
number
V. Contain a proper noun, e.g., the name of a real or
fictitious character or place
A. I,IV,&V
B. I, II, & IV
C. II, III, & V
D. None of the above
E. All of the above
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ID Possible Test Questions Answers
Q5. True or false. Social Engineering is the process of using





Q6. Select the best answer from A through E. Social Engineering
uses which of the following methods?
I. Impersonating system or security administration
staff for information gathering
II. Blackmail
III. Physical threat
IV. Rummaging through a company's garbage
V. Become an employee of the company for the
purpose of gathering information
A. I&II
B. II & III
C. I,IV,&V
D. None of the above
E. All of the above
E





E. Depends on the site's policy
D
Table 5-1 Possible Test Questions
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VL CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Computer and network security are challenges that are ever changing and getting
more complex as time goes on. System and security administrators are overburdened
dealing with the current methods of intrusions and vulnerabilities of their systems.
Administrators also look for new and innovative ways to guard against new methods and
vulnerabilities. The use of cryptography and potentially expensive technical means will
enhance the security of one's systems. This security will fail when one neglects security
education of users.
The thesis addresses a portion of the security education problem by designing and
developing a tool to educate users on the two major successful methods for penetrating a
computer system, weak passwords and social engineering. This prevention tool explains
what attributes make up a good password and what attributes make up a weak password.
The tool also provides guidelines for choosing good passwords, and for protecting
passwords. The tool consists of a tutorial and end with an exam to test user
comprehension concerning picking good passwords and preventing social engineering
attacks.
The development of the weak password and social engineering tool is an attempt,
in a small way, to help administrators maintain security in computer systems and
networks.
Future enhancements to the weak password and social engineering prevention tool
may include an interactive aid for picking passwords. An interactive password aid would
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assist the user in selecting good passwords. This password aid may integrate a password
cracking utility like Crack or Jack the Ripper. On the weak password portion of the
tutorial, Crack and Jack the Ripper are two examples of UNIX password cracking
software available free on the Internet.
Enhancement to the social engineering portion of a tutorial may involve the user in
a simulated social engineering attack. This simulation would present ways for the user to
deal with such an attack.
Future tools in the area of user education could include a tool for orienting new
system administrators on computer security duties. Such a tool could consist of an
integrated toolkit or control panel of various security tools and an interactive tutorial in
the use of the integrated toolkit! Candidate security tools for this integrated toolkit are
Security Analysis Tool for Auditing Networks (SATAN), Internet Security Scanner
(ISS), Crack, and Computer Oracle and Password System (COPS).
SATAN and a stripped-down version of ISS are two network scanners available
free on the Internet. A more complex version of ISS is commercially available. The use of
these scanners may help determine vulnerabilities in one's network that need fixing.
Unfortunately, intruders can also use these tools to find network vulnerabilities to
exploit. (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996)
As mentioned above, Crack is a Unix password cracking utility. Note that similar
password cracking software is available on Windows NT. COPS is a collection of short
shell scripts and C programs that perform vulnerability checks of one's computer system.
Crack and COPS are available free on the Internet. (Garfinkel and Spafford, 1996)
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The tools, policies, procedures, and protocols used to protect information
while being stored and processed on a computer system, and while being
transmitted through a network.
The tools, policies procedures, and protocols used to protect information
while being stored and processed on a computer system.
To discover the true character of, or to discover or determine the
existence, presence, or fact of.
The act of detecting or the state or fact of being detected.
The practice of spying or the use of spies to obtain information about the
plans and activities especially of a foreign government or a competing
company.
To thrust or force in or upon especially without permission, welcome, or
fitness. To cause to enter as if by force.
An intruder is an entity that makes unauthorized access to a computer
system or network. This entity may be a person, an automated agent, or a
combination of the two.
The act of intruding or the state of being intruded; especially the act of
wrongfully entering upon, seizing, or taking possession of the property
of another.
Local Area Network
The tools, policies, procedures, and protocols used to protect information
while being transmitted through a network.
To keep from happening or existing.
The act of preventing or hindering.
Freedom from unauthorized disclosure.
To cover or shield from exposure, injury, or destruction.
The act of protecting or the state of being protected.
The habit or practice of keeping secrets or maintaining privacy or
concealment.
Something kept from the knowledge of others or shared only
confidentially with a few.
To relieve from exposure to danger.
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Security Measures taken to guard against espionage or sabotage, crime, attack, or
escape.
Social Process of using social interactions to obtain information about a
Engineering "victim's" computer system.
WAN Wide Area Network
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APPENDIX A. TOOL ASSEMBLY







The file prevention_tool.html contains the tutorial portion of the tool prevention,
which is in Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) format. TestTool.html file contains the
HTML driver used to integrate the tutorial portion with the testing portion of the tool.
The file TestTool.java is the Java source code for the testing portion of the tool. When
compiled, the TestTool.java source produces the TestTool.class and TestToolFrame.class
class files.
The implementation of this prevention tool took place on a Power Macintosh
8500/120 with 32 MB RAM, running Mac OS 7.5.5. The tutorial produced by using
rtftohtml version 3.8 to convert a Rich Text Format (RTF) of the tutorial to HTML.
Chris Hector is the author of the rtftohtml application. The Java source compiled using
the Java Development Kit (JDK) 1 .0.2 from Sun Microsystems, Inc.
To use the prevention tool one must use a Java aware browser to open the file
prevention_tool.html. Examples of Java aware browsers are Netscape Navigator™ or
Sun's HoUava.
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Appendix B and Appendix C contain the HTML listing ofprevention_tool.html
and TestTool.html, respectively. Appendix D contains the Java source code listing of
TestTool.java.
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APPENDIX B. PREVENTION TOOL TUTORIAL HTML LISTING
<HTML><HEAD>
<!-- This document was created from RTF source by rtftohtml version 3.8 -->
<TITLE>Development of A Internet Intrusion Detection Tool</TITLE></HEAD>
<p><center><b>DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNET INTRUSION PREVENTION
TOOL< /b>< / center><br>
<center><b>Dagohoy Hofilena Anunciado</b></centerxbr>
<center><b>B.S. in Computer Science, University of California, San Diego - June
1990</b></center><br>
<center><b>Master of Science in Software Engineering - December
1 9 97< /b>< / centerxbr>
<center><b>Thesis Advisor: Bert Lundy, Department of Computer Science, Naval
Postgraduate School<br>Co-Advisor : Ron Broersma, SPAWARSYSCEN San
Diego< /b>< /centerxbr>
The purpose of the Internet Intrusion Prevention Tool is to educate users on
the two major successful methods for penetrating a computer system, weak
passwords and social engineering. The tool will teach users how to pick good
passwords and what steps to take to prevent social engineering attacks . The
tool will consist of a tutorial and end with an exam to test user comprehension
concerning picking good passwords and preventing social engineering attacks. <br>
<br>
<b>KEYWORDS: </b>Computer Security, Social Engineering, Intrusion Prevention<br>
<br>
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of the world's businesses today are moving toward the use of the Internet. Many
companies see the Internet playing a more fundamental role in their operations,
as an inexpensive, easy-to-deploy wide area transport network. Fifty-one
Fortune 1000 companies were asked if the Internet could replace other Wide Area
Network (WAN) technologies. The response was 45% yes, 6% already happening, 27%
no, and 22% maybe. In a follow-up question, "What capabilities would the
Internet need before you would use it as a WAN?" The top response of 75% of
companies was the need for better security. <br>
<br>
To provide better security to computer systems and the Internet will require
educating the users and maintainers of these services. The solution to this
problem of providing better security requires that all computer users get
involved. Users need to realize that attacks on computer systems and the
Internet are not just attacks on individual systems, but are attacks on the
entire community. Overburdened maintainers need automated tools to help secure
these services. There is a need to develop an infrastructure that has security
built into it from the beginning. <br>
<br>
The tutorial addresses a portion of security education by educating users on
the two major successful methods for penetrating a computer system or network,
weak passwords and social engineering. The tutorial teaches users how to pick
good passwords and what steps to take to prevent social engineering attacks.
The tutorial consists of a tutorial and end with an exam to test user
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the purposes of this tutorial the definition of <i>computer and network
security</i> are the tools, policies, procedures, and protocols used to protect
information being stored and processed on a computer system, and while being
transmitted through a network. <br>
<br>
Primary concern of computer security is with the protection of individual
computer systems, whether or not the system is connected to a network. Primary
concern of network security is with communication channels. Many of the threats
to computers enter from a network channel and the endpoints of communications
channels are usually computers. One can not ignore either of the concerns of




<A NAME="Heading3">A. DEFINITION OF AN INTRUDER</A></h2>
<p>An
intruder is an entity that makes unauthorized access to a computer system or





<A NAME="Heading4">B. METHODS OF IDENTIFICATION /Ax/h2>
<p>The
one way in which a computer system provides security is by controlling access
to that system. This access is usually controlled by forcing one to identify
oneself and having the system authenticate one's identity. In a multi-user
system there are three classic methods for proving one's identity. <br>
<br>
The first method is knowing something that no one else knows. For example,
having a secret password to an account that no one else knows implies ownership
of the account. In the majority of cases this method provides a more than
adequate means of proving one's identity. The weakness of this method is
passwords may be stolen or obtained by other means. A stolen password may have
come about by writing the password down and someone else reading that password.
One may have given the password away. The password may be easy to guess, or
found through systematic cracking methods. <br>
<br>
The second method for proving one's identity is to have something that no one
else has. This may be a key, token, badge, or smart card. To have something
that no one else has implies ownship of the account. The weakness with this
method of proving one's identity is a key or equivalent may be stolen, lost, or
dupl icated . <br>
<br>
The third and final classic method used to prove identity is by biometrics.
This method uses a previously stored biometric to prove one's identity.
Biometrics is the use of physical or behavior traits to identify a person.
These traits may include fingerprint, handprint, retina pattern, voice,
signature, or keystroke pattern. Biometrics systems are quite accurate, yet on
occasions, reject valid users and accept invalid ones. The problem with this
system is that many people are not comfortable using it.<br>
<br>
An additional method used to prove one's identity is to used a combination of
the above methods. By using a combination of methods, the weaknesses of an
individual method are minimized. For example, using a combination of a password
and smart card to prove one's identity would still prevent an intruder who
somehow obtained the password from accessing the system, and visa versa.
<a name="_Ref404540330"x/a><a name="_Toc406789608"></a></p>
<h3>
<A NAME="Heading5">l. Authentication Using Passwords</A></h3>
<p>The
use of passwords is still the authentication tool of choice, with the use of
smart cards and biometrics as secondary authentication tools. Most systems
require one to identify themselves with a login identifier followed by a
password. UNIX and Windows NT systems are example systems.
<a name="_Ref404542123 "></ax/p>
<h4>
<A NAME= " Heading6 " >a ) Difficult to Guess Passwords</Ax/h4>
<p>Dif ficult
to guess passwords are the main defense against intruders . The best passwords
are difficult to guess because they:</p>
<p>l. Have both uppercase and lowercase letters. <br>
2. Have digits and punctuation characters as well as letters. Be cautious with
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some special characters, e.g., #, and @, for these may have special meaning to
terminal emulation software. <br>
3. May include some control characters and spaces. Control characters like
CONTROL-S, CONTROL-H, CONTROL-/, and CONTROL-\ can cause problem with terminal
emulation software. <br>
4. Are easy to remember, and so need not be written down.</p>
<h4>
<A NAME="Heading7">b) Weak Passwords*: /A></h4>
<p>Easy
to guess and weak passwords may have the following attributes :</p>
<p>l. Are in a dictionary of some language . <br>
2. Contain a proper noun, e.g., the name of a real or fictitious character or
place. <br>
3. Are acronyms common to some specific field or profession. <br>
4. Are a variation of a first or a last name.<br>
5. Match the login identifier or account. <br>
6. Contain the vender-supplied default passwords . <br>
7. Contain no password at all.
<a name="_Ref404541129 "></ax/p>
<h4>
<A NAME="Heading8">c) Good Password</A></h4>
<p>The
following are some suggestions for picking a good password: </p>
<p>l. Combine short words with a special character or a number, e.g., sale2noon
or love-hate. <br>
2. Choose an easy-to-remember phrase or lyric, and use the first letters to
form a password. Also add punctuation or mixed case letters. For example, "Hush
a my baby", would become Ham-b-.<br>




<A NAME="Heading9">d) Protecting Passwords</A></h4>
<p>Passwords
and the file that store passwords need protection. The following are some
suggestions for protecting passwords :</p>
<p>l. Make sure that all logins have password. <br>
2. Change all system, test, or guest passwords before allowing users to log in.




Do not ever share user passwords . <br>
4. Do not write a password down, especially on a terminal, a computer, or
anywhere around a workspace. If one does write down a password, do not identify
it as a password. One may want to disguise a password by expanding it to a
phrase . <br>
5. Do not type a password while anyone is watching . <br>
6. Do not record a password online or send a password using electronic mail.
<i>The Cuckoo's Egg</i>, Clifford Stoll (1989), relates a story of how an
intruder gathered valid passwords by scanning a system's email and text files
for the word "password" . If one does need to store passwords and accounts
online or send them using email, use encryption to protect the file or message.
<br>
7. Change a password immediately if one believes the password is stolen. <br>
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if a password is not compromised,


























<A NAME="HeadinglO">C. EFFECTIVE METHODS USED TO INTRUDE-;/Ax /h2>
<p>Effective
methods used to intrude on a system's security are the use of social
engineering and password cracking.
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<A NAME="Headingll">l. Social Engineering</Ax/h3>
<p>The
hacker community associates the term Social Engineering with the process of
using social interactions to obtain information about a "victim's" computer
system. This interaction may be as simple as calling a company and asking
people for their passwords, possibly by impersonating a company's information
security staff. Blackmail and physical threat are other methods of Social
Engineering. More elaborate methods used to obtain a company's sensitive
information include going through the company's garbage, posing as an employee
of the company, or even becoming an employee of the company.


















The advantages of social engineering are low cost, simple to implement, time




<A NAME="Headingl2">2 . Password Cracking</Ax/h3>
<p>Password
cracking is obtaining a target host's password file and running password
cracking software against the password file. This password cracking method
attempts to find valid passwords for accounts in the password file. Examples of
UNIX password cracking software are Crack and John the Ripper. Note that
similar password cracking software is available on Windows NT. Finding the root
password would be the most threatening to a system's security, since an
intruder will have total access to the targeted host. One of the best defenses
against password cracking is having difficult-to-guess passwords for all
accounts in the password file. See Section II. 1. a for guidelines in choosing
difficult to guess passwords.
<a name="_Toc395095765 "x/axa name="_Toc395275800"x/axa name="_Toc396448563"x/axa
name="_Toc3 96533 Oil "x/axa name=
name="_Toc3 973 82178 "></axa name=
name="_Toc398075273 "x/axa name-
name- "_Toc4 2 8 8 8 1 03 " >< /axa name=
name="_Toc403805151"x/axa name=







_Toc404437800" x/axa name="_Toc40443 8885 "x/axa
<h2>
<A NAME="Headingl3">D. PREVENTING SOCIAL ENGINEERING</Ax/h2>
<p>The
following are suggest ions for preventing Social Engineering :</p>
<p>l. Do Not Rely Upon Common Internal Identifiers<br>
2. Implement a Call Back Procedure When Disclosing Protected Information<br>
3. Implement a Security Awareness Program<br>
4. Identify Direct Computer Support Analysts<br>
5. Create A Security Alert System<br>
6. Social Engineering to Test Security Policies
<a name="_Toc406789613"x/ax/p>
<h3>
<A NAME="Headingl4">l . Do Not Rely Upon Common Internal Identifiers</Ax/h3>
<p>Many
companies rely on some type of identifier to authenticate employees, e.g. , an
Employee Number. Unfortunately, intruders will compile a list of valid
identifiers and use these identifiers to authenticate themselves when
challenged. Intruders easily obtain identifiers from real employees as part of
the Social Engineering attack. <br>
<br>
Companies should separate personnel functions from computer support functions
by having a separate identifier for the two activities. A separate identifier
would provide additional security to both personnel and computer activities.
<a name="_Toc406789614"x/ax/p>
<h3>
<A NAME="Headingl5">2. Implement a Call Back Procedure When Disclosing Protected
Information< /A>< /h3 >
<p>One
may have prevented many of the Social Engineering attacks by verifying the
67
identity of the caller by calling them back at their proper telephone number,
as listed in the company telephone directory. This procedure creates a minimal
inconvenience to legitimate activities, while providing enhanced security for
the company sensitive information. Requiring employees to call back anyone
asking for personal or proprietary information minimize compromises . Use of
Caller ID services might also be an acceptable solution.
<a name="_Toc4067 89615 "></ax/p>
<h3>
<A NAME="Headingl6">3 Implement a Security Awareness Program</Ax/h3>
<p>Computer
professionals cannot assume that basic security practices are basic to
non-computer professionals. A good security awareness program implemented at
minimal cost can save a company from loosing millions of dollars. Without a
good security awareness program, non-computer professionals would not know that
giving out one's password to a stranger is a security risk to the company's
information.
<a name="_Toc4067 89616 "></ax/p>
<h3>
<A NAME="Headingl7">4. Identify Direct Computer Support Analysts</Ax/h3>
<p>Every
employee of a company should have one computer analyst be the focal point for
all computer support, and should be the only person to directly contact the
employee. Each analyst should have assigned no more than 60 employees, and
instruct all employees to contact their analyst if ever contacted by someone




<A NAME="Headingl8">5. Create A Security Alert System</Ax/h3>
<p>A
security alert system should be in place to allow an employee to alert other
employees of a possible intrusion. It is important to note that without this
system, intruders are able to continue the same Social Engineering attacks.
Security alert system is paramount to barring easy access for intruders.
<a name="_Toc406789618"x/ax/p>
<h3>
<A NAME="Headingl9">6. Social Engineering to Test Security Policies</Ax/h3>
<p>The
only conceivable method to test security policies and their effectiveness is by
using Social Engineering. There are many security assessments to test for
physical and electronic vulnerabilities, but few assessments study the human
vulnerabilities inherent in computer users. Note that only qualified and
trusted people should perform these attacks
.























<A NAME="Heading20">E. PREVENTING PASSWORD CRACKING</Ax/h2>
<p>The
best ways to prevent password cracking are to create difficult-to-guess
passwords, and to protect the passwords and the file that store passwords.
Refer to Section II.l.c and Section Il.l.d, for suggestions on how to choose
good passwords and how to protect passwords, respectively.
<a name="_Toc406789620"x/a></p>
<hl>




APPENDIX C. TEST TOOL DRIVER HTML LISTING
<html>
<body>






APPENDIX D. TEST TOOL JAVA SOURCE CODE LISTING
//
// Project: TestTool. java
//
// Description: Test tool portion of thesis tutorial on social engineering and
// weak passwords
//
// Author: Dagohoy H. Anunciado
//
// Date: 09 November 1997
//
import Java. applet .Applet;
import j ava . awt . *
;
public class TestTool extends Applet {
public static final int NUM_QUESTIONS = 7;
public static final int MAX_CHECKBOXS = 5;
public static final int MAX_TEXT_WIDTH = 50;
public static final float PASSINGGRADE = 70. Of;
CardLayout testToolDeck = new CardLayout ( )
;
Button nextButton = new Button ( "Next" )
;
Button finishButton = new Button ( "Finish" )
Panel borderPanel [ ] - new Panel [NUM_QUESTIONS]
;




Panel questionCards = new Panel ( )
;
CheckboxGroup cbg[] = new CheckboxGroup[NUM_QUESTIONS]
;
TextArea question [] = new TextArea [NUM_QUESTIONS]
;
TextArea finalTextArea;
Checkbox answerBox [ ] [ ] = new Checkbox [NUM_QUESTIONS] [MAX_CHECKBOXS]
;
Checkbox answerKey[] = new Checkbox [NUM_QUESTIONS ]
;
String resultText;
int totalPossibleScore = 0;
int score = 0;
float percent = ( float) 0.0;
public static void main(String args [ ] ) {
TestToolFrame app
= new TestToolFrame ("TestTool Application Window");
app. resize (450, 450)
;
app . show ( )
;
app . applet . start ( )
;
}
public void init ( ) {
int i = 0, j = 0, k = 0, 1=0;
int question_index = 0;
GridBagLayout gl = new GridBagLayout ( )
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"Question 1. \n" +
"\n" +
"True or false. The definition of computer security\n" +
"is the tools, policies, procedures, and protocols used\n"
"to protect information stored and processed on\n" +
"a computer system.",
7, // Number of question lines plus 1
MAX_TEXT_WIDTH)
;
question[i] .setEdi table (false) ;
cbg [ i ] = new CheckboxGroup ( )
;
answerKey [i] = // Correct answer A.
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new Checkbox ("A. True", cbg[i] , true); j++;










"What are the two most successful methods used to intrude\n"
"on a computer system's security?\n" +
I. Social Engineering\n" +
" II. Exploiting weak passwords\n" +
"III. Sharing passwords\n" +
" IV. Leaving computer logged into one's account \n" +
" V. Exploiting an operating system vulnerability",
10, // Number of question lines plus 1
MAX_TEXT_WIDTH)
;
question[i] .setEdi tablet false) ;
cbg [ i ] = new CheckboxGroup ( )
;
answerKey [i] = // Correct answer A.
answerBox [ i ][ j ] = new CheckboxC'A. I & II", cbg[i], true); j++;
answerBox [ i ][ j ] = new Checkbox("B. II & III",cbg[i], false); j++;
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new CheckboxC'C. IV & V",cbg[i], false); j++;
answerBox [ i ][ j ] = new Checkbox("D. I & III",cbg[i], false); j++;











'Select the best answer from A through E. What attributes \n" +
'make up a good password? \n" +
I. Easy to rememberXn" +
II. Contain acronyms common to a specific field or profession\n" +
'III. Difficult to guessXn" +
IV. Have digits and punctuation characters as well as letters \n" +
V. Are a variation of a first or a last name",
10, // Number of question lines plus 1
MAX_TEXT_WIDTH)
;
question [i] .setEdi table ( false)
;
cbg [ i ] = new CheckboxGroup ( )
;
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new Checkbox ( "A
.
answerKey[i] = // Correct answer B.
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new Checkbox ( " B
answerBox[i] [j] = new Checkbox ("C.
answerBox [ i ] [ j
]
answerBox [ i ] [ j
I, II, & IV", cbg[i], true); j++;
I, III, & IV", cbg[i], false); j++;
I, IV, &V",cbg[i], false); j++;
new Checkbox("D. None of the above", cbg[i] , false);













"Select the best answer from A through E. What attributes\n" +
"make up weak password? \n" +
I. Have both uppercase and lowercase letters \n" +
1 II. Are in a dictionary of some language\n" +
III. Contain no password at all\n" +
1 IV. Combine short words with a special character or a number\n" +
V. Contain a proper noun, e.g., the name of a real or\n" +
' fictitious character or place"
,





question! i] . setEditable (false)
;
cbg [ i ] = new CheckboxGroup ( )
;
answerBox [i] [j] = new Checkbox ("A. I, IV, & V",
answerBox [ i ][ j ] - new Checkbox ("B. I, II, & IV"
answerKey[i] = // Correct answer C.
answerBox [ i ][ j ] = new Checkbox ( "C. II, III, & V",cbg[i], false); j++;
answerBox [ i ][ j ] = new Checkbox ("D. None of the above", cbg[i], false)










"True or false. Social Engineering is the process \n" +
"of using social interactions to obtain information\n"
75
"about a company's computer system?",
6, // Number of question lines plus 1
MAX_TEXT_WIDTH)
;
question[i] . setEditable( false) ;
cbg [ i ] = new CheckboxGroup ( ) ;
answerKey [i] = // Correct answer A.
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new Checkbox ("A. True",
answerBox[i] [j] = new Checkbox ("B. False"













'Select the best answer from A through E.\n" +
'Social Engineering uses which of the following methods?\n" +
I. Impersonating system or security administration staff \n" +
for information gathering\n" +
II. BlackmailXn" +
'III. Physical threat\n" +
IV. Rummaging through a company's garbage\n" +
V. Become an employee of the company for the purpose\n" +
of gathering information"
,
12, // Number of question lines plus 1
MAX_TEXT_WIDTH)
question[i] . setEditable( false) ;
cbg [ i ] = new CheckboxGroup ( ) ;
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new Checkbox (
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new Checkbox
(
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new Checkbox
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new Checkbox
answerKey [ i ] = /
/






I & II", cbg[i], true); j++;
II & III", cbg[i], false); j++;
I, IV, &V", cbg[i], false); j++;
None of the above", cbg[i], false); j++;
Correct answer E.
new Checkbox("E. All of the above", cbg[i], false); j++;








"Is it proper to share passwords?",
4, // Number of question lines plus 1
MAX_TEXT_WIDTH)
;
question [i] . setEditable ( false) ;
cbg [ i ] = new CheckboxGroup ( ) ;
answerBox[i] [j] = new Checkbox ("A.
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new Checkbox ( " B
.
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new Checkbox ( " C
answerKey [i] = // Correct answer D.
answerBox [ i ] [ j ] = new Checkbox ( " D
Generally yes", cbg[i] , true); j++;
Generally no", cbg[i], false); j++;
Yes", cbg[i], false); j++;
No", cbg[i], false); j++;
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// Setup GUI Layout
questionCards . setLayout (testToolDeck) ,-
gb. anchor = GridBagConstraints.WEST;
gb.gridwidth = 2;
for (k = 0; k < i; k++) {
borderPanel[k] = new Panel ()
;
borderPanel [k] . setLayout (new BorderLayout ( ) ) ;
questionPanel [k] = new Panel ()
;
questionPanel [k] .setLayout (gl)
gb.gridx = 0;
gb.gridy = 0;










for (1=0; 1 < MAX_CHECKBOXS; 1++) {
if (answerBox [k] [1] != null) {
gl. setConstraints (answerBox [k] [1] , gb)
;










borderPanel [k] .add ("West",
(k != i-1) ? (new Button ( "Next" ))
:
(new Button ( "Finish" ) ) )
;




// Final Panel: Test Results
//
gb. anchor = GridBagConstraints.WEST;
gb.gridwidth = 2;
finalBorderPanel = new Panel () ,-
finalBorderPanel . setLayout (new BorderLayout ( ) )
;
finalPanel = new Panel ( )
;














7, // Number of question lines plus 1
MAX_TEXT_WIDTH)
;
finalTextArea. setEdi tablet false)
;













public boolean mouseDown (Event event, int x, int y) {
/ / Used for debugging purposes
.
//
// testToolDeck. next (questionCards)
return true;
}
public boolean action (Event e, Object o) {
boolean result = false;
int i = 0;
if (e. target instanceof Button) {
String s = (String) o;
if ( ! s. equals ( "Finish" ) ) {
testToolDeck. next (questionCards) ,-
} else {
// Calculate test results
for (i = 0; i < NUM_QUESTIONS; i++) {





percent - 100 * score/ ( (float) totalPossibleScore)
;
resultText
= "Correct Answers: " +
score + " of " + totalPossibleScore + "\n" +
"Percent Correct: " + percent + "\n\n" +
( (percent > PASSINGGRADE)
?
"Congratulation you received a passing grade! \n"
:
"Please review the material and retake the test.\n")












class TestToolFrame extends Frame {
TestTool applet;
public TestToolFrame (String frameName) {
super ( frameName)
;
applet = new TestTool ();
add( "Center" , applet)
;
applet. init ( )
;
}
public boolean handleEvent (Event event) {
if (event. id == Event. WINDOW_DESTROY) {
applet. stop ( )
;
applet . destroy ( )
;
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